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that a religion of science and democracy is the final form of religion because it is consciously open to growth and to fuller spiritual values. Perhaps a firmer faith in the spiritual values of our growing social order would also have prevented even the suggestion in the last pages of a new development through communications from the other world as claimed by Sir Oliver Lodge.

The book is a clear, comprehensive, scholarly work, involving much labor and thought, and presented to the reader without the scaffolding and by-products of footnotes and references.

E. S. AMES.

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PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JAMES EDWIN CREIGHTON.

By former Students. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1917. \$2.00.

This volume consists of twenty-two essays in the fields of psychology, epistemology, religion, ethics, and the history of philosophy. Unlike "Personal Idealism," "The New Realism," and "Creative Intelligence," it is not a carefully planned effort in co-operative thinking, but the essays are separate and independent, held together mainly by the tie of personal allegiance to Professor Creighton as teacher. In spite, however, of certain discrepancies in principle as well as in detail, there is a thread of philosophical unity which runs through the greater part of the book. Most of the essayists adopt the general standpoint of the Critical Philosophy, and are critical rather than constructive. Along with an explicit appreciation of the work of other philosophical schools, there goes a fairly general agreement that Absolute Idealism is too transcendental, that Neo-Realism is without inner light and serves only to emancipate from the premises of traditional British dualism, and especially that Pragmatism and Instrumentalism are excessively biological, even excessively mechanical, in their viewpoint, and cannot consistently do justice to ethical and social values, or to the intellectual life in its higher reaches. On the constructive side, emphasis is laid upon the necessity of a new synthesis of voluntarism and intellectualism, and upon the importance of social, as well as of biological categories.

Considered as a whole, the importance of the book for the student of ethics is slight. Most of the essayists are interested chiefly in other fields of investigation, and come in contact with

ethics mainly in the form of polemical statements to the effect that writers who belong to other schools cannot do justice to ethical and social life. There are, however, two papers which deal more directly with subjects which call for the attention of the ethical student.

In "The Relation of Punishment to Disapprobation," Professor Th. de Laguna points out (1) that many important classes of adverse moral judgments seldom issue in punishment, *e.g.*, cowardice, intemperance, folly, and selfishness, and, to a lesser extent, lying, inhospitality, and neglect of parental duties. In the second place (2), when punishment *is* inflicted, it is not as a rule for the moral offense as such, but for insubordination of some sort, as when a soldier sleeps on his post, or when drunkenness leads to disorderliness. From this and similar evidence, the writer argues that punishment is not (as Westermarck believes) essentially an expression of moral disapprobation, but is a natural and inevitable concomitant of the principle of authority in social life, which again is bound up with the principle of social co-operation. He proceeds to apply this conclusion (1) to the origin and growth of the institution of punishment, and (2) to present-day ethics, maintaining that the primitive function of supporting authority is the only legitimate function of punishment, and that, while it is sometimes indispensable to this end, it is not always the best means, and is sometimes entirely useless. He finally indicates that a similar application of his conclusions to moral approbation can be made.

The paper is highly original, and, as a contribution to our understanding of the origin and growth of the moral sentiments, important. But the contention that punishment at the present day should be restricted to maintaining authority, *i.e.*, to supporting the principle of social co-operation—while interesting and suggestive, is not logically compelling. Surely, the proper uses of punishment, as of other social institutions, can be established only by actual experiment, and not by reference to a history of origins.

In "Freedom as an Ethical Postulate" by Professor R. A. Tsanoff, Kant's tendency to treat "freedom" from a non-empirical viewpoint is regarded as a relic of theological dogmatism, and the Kantian issue is declared to be an anachronism. The real task of ethical science is stated to be, to analyze the concepts of praise and blame, responsibility and the implications of conduct-

evaluation, in whatever fields these are actually applied, without forcing issues which are in no sense ethical.

The greater part of this essay is taken up with the criticism of Kant—a criticism in the main correct, but, in view of all that has already been written upon the subject, somewhat indeterminate. The constructive portion is a mere sketch, the outlines of which, though doubtless sound enough, are, in the essay, matters of unsupported assertion.

The remaining papers, as already stated, only touch incidentally upon subjects of direct ethical significance.

R. C. LODGE.

STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS. By Members of the Department of Philosophy of Columbia University. New York: Columbia University Press, 1918. Pp. 272.

The authors of these studies say that the volume expresses their desire to encourage research and the exercise of historical imagination and to contribute something to the work being done in this department of human interest.

The table of contents shows thirteen essays. In traditional terminology four of the essays would be called 'metaphysical,' three 'logical,' and three 'politico-ethical.' A note on "Dr. Thomas Brown's contribution to Aesthetics" "by Mr. Jones, a paper on "Francis Bacon and the History of Philosophy" by Mr. Coss, and a discriminating study by Mr. Balz of "The Psychology of Ideas in Hobbes" complete the list.

As the space of this review has very definite limits and as most of the readers of this JOURNAL are presumably more interested in the politico-ethical discussions, the other essays will have to be noticed 'by title.' The metaphysical papers include a suggestive interpretation of "Spinoza's Pantheistic Argument" by Mr. Cooley, a discussion of the meaning of *φύσις* in early Greek philosophy by Mr. Veazie, and an essay on "Appearance and Reality in Greek Philosophy" by Mr. McClure, who shows very clearly the difference in meaning and function of these categories as they are employed in the different interests of science, of religious mysticism and of ethics and politics. The last of the metaphysical essays is on "Berkeley's Realism." This is by Mr. Woodbridge whose thesis is that Berkeley's Realism is the controlling motive in his philosophy and that this has been obscured by interpreting Berkeley through Locke. Needless to say the thesis is ably defended.